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Available online 23 June 2016Psychiatric expert testimony is challenging in cases of violence when the accused person submits a defence that
he or shewas so overwhelmed by emotions triggered by an upsetting event that his or her violent behaviour was
an uncontrollable consequence of the emotions. This defence is usually presented in terms of an automatism par-
ticularly not attributed to a mental disorder. Clouding testimony in these cases is the various deﬁnitions of both
automatism and mental disorder—deﬁnitions by which the jurisprudential distinction is made between a sane
and an insane automatism, or pathological and non-pathological incapacity (NPCI).
To avert testimony that is tainted from the very beginning by the lack of agreed deﬁnitions, this article proposes
that psychiatrists focus in their assessment and testimonyonparticularly the behaviour as being distinct from the
jurisprudential concernswhether that behaviour constitutes an automatism andwhether it is (not) attributed to
a mental disorder. This focus on the behaviour affords clarity by which the properties of the behaviour may be
examined theoretically and clinically in terms of behaviour therapy, specifying accordingly its antecedents,
consequences, topography, intensity, latency, duration, frequency, and quality.
So informed, the behaviour that underpins NPCI and automatism is described here as emotionally triggered
involuntary violent behaviour about which testimony may be given distinct from whether the behaviour is
(not) causally attributed to a mental disorder, and from jurisprudential concerns with accountability.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Mental disorder1. Introduction
Psychiatric expert testimony is challenging in cases of violent crimes,
usually murder, for which the accused person submits a defence to the
effect that he or she was so overwhelmed by emotions triggered by an
upsetting event that a court of law should not ﬁnd him or her guilty of
an offence, because the behaviourwas in someway or another involun-
tary owing to the uncontrollable effects of the emotions. Sometimes,
these cases are referred to as crimes of passion. This defence goes
hand in hand with the insistence that there had been no mental
disorder at the time of the alleged offence.
This article is about testimony on the behaviour that is relevant to a
defence generally known as that of “psychological blow automatism”
(Bourget & Whitehurst, 2004; Campbell, 1980–1981; Livingston &, South Africa. Tel.: +27 12 319
t), werdie.vanstaden@up.ac.za
Africa. Tel.: +27 12,319 9744;
. This is an open access article underVerdun-Jones, 2002–2003; Samuels, O'Driscoll, & Allnutt, 2007; Wells
& Wilson, 2004). It highlights the apparently unresolvable divergences
in deﬁnitions of both automatism and mental disorder in these
cases—deﬁnitions by which the jurisprudential distinction is made
between a sane and an insane automatism, or pathological and non-
pathological incapacity (NPCI).
To avert confusion caused by the divergent deﬁnitions, this article
proposes that psychiatrists focus principally in their assessment and
testimony on particularly the behaviour as being distinct from the juris-
prudential concernswhether that behaviour constitutes an automatism
and whether it is attributed to a mental disorder. We argue that this
focus, informed by behavioural theory, affords potentially crucial testi-
mony that is not tainted from the very beginning by the lack of univer-
sally agreed deﬁnitions for both an automatism and a mental disorder.
Furthermore, a clinical assessment focussed on the behaviour is suitably
within the scope of psychiatric expertise, whereas it is for courts of law
to decide whether the behaviour counts as a defence in terms of legal
requirements for (if still important) an automatism, or other jurispru-
dential considerations.
Although arguably also relevant to other jurisdictions, this article is
mainly based on the challenges South African psychiatrists experience
when evaluating, reporting, and giving expert testimony in thesethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ﬁrst, before highlighting different takes, affected by the jurisprudential
concern with accountability, on what constitutes an automatism.8 S v Eadie supra at paragraph 61.
9 S v Eadie supra at paragraph 70.
10 S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A).
11 For Kaliski's description of automatism see S v Eadie supra at paragraph 14. Also see S v
Potgieter (1) SACR (A) 61 1994, pg. 84–85, and Kaliski, 2006:107–108.
12 See footnote 11.2. The “insanity” defence in South Africa andnon-pathological crim-
inal incapacity (NPCI)
Criminal courts in South Africa rely on psychiatric testimony for
purposes of sections 78 and 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act No.
51 of 1977, as amended2 (which will be referred to as the Criminal
Procedure Act). These sections address whether the accused person
was lacking in an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her be-
haviour at the time of the offence, or whether he or she could not
act in accordance with an appreciation of wrongfulness. By this tes-
timony, the court may ﬁnd the accused not accountable and hence
not guilty. Whether the accused poses a threat to others has no bear-
ing hereto (contra R v Luedcke, 2008).3
The most commonly used Section 78(5)(a)(b) makes provision for
lack of capacity owing to speciﬁcally “a mental illness or mental defect”
that rendered an accused incapable of “acting in accordancewith an ap-
preciation of the wrongfulness of his or her act or omission”. The less
commonly used Section 78(5)(c) makes provision for lack of criminal
capacity not caused by a mental illness or mental defect but “for any
other reason”. Whether rendered incapable by “amental illness ormen-
tal defect” or “any other reason” has amajor jurisprudential implication.
The Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that when a court ﬁnds criminal
incapacity caused by a mental illness or defect, the court must ﬁnd the
accused not guilty and has the option to order that the accused be
detained under appropriate circumstances (usually a psychiatric hospi-
tal), but when an accused is found not guilty on grounds of incapacity
owing to “any other reason” he or she is not only fully acquitted but
also released back into society without any legal consequence. This per-
tains irrespective of the seriousness of a charge (Snyman, 2008: 56–57).
Relevant to Section 78(5)(c) is a South African legal term called non-
pathological criminal incapacity (NPCI). This phrase was coined in the
Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of S v Laubscher by Joubert JA
(Joubert Justice of Appeal). By creating the term, NPCI, Joubert JA
wanted to distinguish between a defence of incapacity not attributed
to mental illness or immature age (Snyman, 2008: 162–169). The latter
is also called a “sane automatism” (Snyman, 2008: 56) that is triggered
by intense emotional distress. Other phrases that have been used in
South African courts by mental health professionals and lawyers alike
are “emotional storm” and “acute catathymic crisis”,4 “emotional
ﬂooding of the mind”;5 “non-pathological automatism” and “psycho-
genic automatism”.6All of these phrases, refer to a defence that may
elsewhere be better known as that of a “psychological blow automa-
tism” (Bourget & Whitehurst, 2004; Campbell, 1980–1981; Livingston
& Verdun-Jones, 2002–2003; Samuels et al., 2007; Wells & Wilson,
2004).
The term NPCI was intended to give clarity on matters regarding
criminal incapacity not attributed to a mental illness or defect. Instead
it caused confusion that was reﬂected in High Court decisions and aca-
demic writing. Navsa JA of the Supreme Court of Appeal described and
criticised this state of affairs in S v Eadie.7 Perturbed by the “misapplica-
tion” of decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal, Navsa JA said, “The
time has come to face up to the fact that in some instances our courts,2 Criminal Procedures Act, No. 51 of 1977, retrieved May 04, 2015 from http://www.
justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1977-051.
3 R. v. Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII). Retrieved on 2015-05-13 from http://www.
canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2008/2008onca716/2008onca716.html.
4 See for example S v Nursingh (2) SACR (D) 331 (1995).
5 See for example S v Smith (1) SACR (A) 130 (1990).
6 See for example S v Henry (1) SACR (SCA) 13 (1999). Retrieved on 2015-05-13 from
http://www.saﬂii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1998/109.html.
7 S v Eadie 2002 (3) SA 719 (SCA) at paragraphs 52–61. Retrieved May 05, 2015 from
http://www.saﬂii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2002/24.html.in dealingwith accused personswithwhom they have sympathy, either
because of the circumstances in which an offence has been committed,
or because the deceased or victim of a violent attack was a particularly
vile human being, have resorted to reasoning that is not consistent
with the approach of the decisions of this Court [the SCA].”8 He
then clariﬁed NPCI by insisting that it should be understood as an
automatism.9 However, he did not deﬁne an automatism, nor was it
deﬁned in the case of S v Wiid for which the defence of NPCI turned
out to be successful.10 Several expert witnesses have since testiﬁed
inconsistently on what an automatism would be.113. Inconclusive state of affairs on what constitutes an automatism
A number of authors have described the inconclusive state of affairs
in their review of deﬁnitions for automatisms (see for example Fenwick,
1990; Arboleda-Flórez, 2002; Yeo, 2002; Coles, 2000; McLeod, Byrne, &
Aitken, 2004, and Campbell, 1980–1981). Arboleda-Flórez wrote that,
“Automatism in law, therefore, is fraught with deep social and political
implications, let alone scientiﬁc controversies about its existence out-
side of a narrow range of neurological and psychiatric conditions”
(Arboleda-Flórez, 2002). In forensic psychiatry the confusion is
expressed for example by Fenwick (1990), whowrites “Where the pro-
fessions [referring to the legal andmedical professions] differ is onwhat
constitutes automatism andwhat constitutes unconsciousness, and this
remains a point of conﬂict”.
Adding to these reviews in describing the inconclusive state of affairs,
we compare four well-established psychiatric deﬁnitions of automatism,
namely those of Briscoe et al. (1993:56–59); Simon (2005: 3969–3987),
Kaliski,12 and Sadock (2009, p 921). This serves the purpose to highlight
the divergences aswell as articulate the behaviour common to thesedeﬁni-
tions, that is, the behaviour that underpins automatism.
In summary, these four deﬁnitions of automatismmake reference to
behaviour that is donewhile consciousness is impaired; behaviour done
without full awareness; behaviour about which one has no knowledge;
behaviour that is not willed, planned, purposeful, that is not produced
intentionally, and for which cognitive functions are absent.
Unconscious behaviour is a central requirement for behaviour to be
considered an automatism according to Simon (2005: 3969–3987) and
Briscoe et al. (1993: 56–59), but not so in the descriptions of Kaliski
(2006: 107–108) and Sadock (2009 p. 921). The issue on what is
meant by “unconscious” was evident during the trial of the Canadian
case R v Stone13 where “unconsciousness”meant “ﬂat out on the ﬂoor”
to a psychiatrist,14 but for the lawyers it meant “not knowing what
one is doing”.15 In some cases unconscious necessarily means impaired
consciousness, such as is found during sleepwalking, concussion, and an
epileptic seizure (Briscoe et al., 1993: 56–59; Bazil and Pedley (2010);
Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland, 1961;16 R v K, 197017).
In other cases unconscious does not necessarily mean impaired con-
sciousness, but may also involve dissociative states (Fenwick, 1990;
Harding, 1993: 135; Bourget & Whitehurst, 2004; R v Stone18).13 R v Stone. Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada. R v Stone [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290. Re-
trieved Jan. 22, 2015 from http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1705/index.
do
14 R v Stone supra at paragraph 32.
15 R v Stone supra at paragraph 32.
16 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1961] UKHL 3 (03 October 1961). BALII.
Thewhole case needs to be studied, but see especially LordDenning's remarks p. 7–11. Re-
trieved March 14, 2012 from http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1961/3.html
17 R v K Ontario High Court of Justice. In: R. v. Stone supra at paragraph 31.
18 R v Stone supra. The whole verdict is applicable, but see for example p. 44, 109–110,
115.
22 S v Eadie supra paragraph 61.
23 S v Eadie supra at paragraph 65.
24 S v Eadie supra at paragraph 34, and S v Henry above at paragraph 14.
25 R vH 1962 (1) SA 197 (A) at pg. 208.H′s defencewas to the effect that hewas somuch
under the inﬂuence of alcohol that he was in a state of automatism. His appeal failed.
26 S v Henry supra at paragraph 14.
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obfuscation. For Simon unconscious may include mental obfuscation,
but it is not clear that mental obfuscation is a requirement, because
Simon (2005: 3986) allows for “dissociation without full awareness”.
It is not clear whether that means partial awareness; whether dissocia-
tion without full awareness means being in a dissociative daze as may
happen after a severe traumatic experience, or whether it includes the
states of having a clear sensorium as found during some of dissociative
states of dissociative identity disorder. Most descriptions of dissociative
states describes consciousness as being intact (in the sense that there is
no clouding of consciousness—see for example dissociative identity
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: 292–294)), although
alterations in consciousness may occur (for example in trance states)
(During, Elahi, Taieb, Moro, & Baubet, 2011).
For both Kaliski and Sadock, unconsciousness is not a requirement.
For Kaliski19 it is instead about loss of control over behaviour, stated
as “...where one's cognitive functions are absent and consequently
one's actions are unplanned and undirected”. For Sadock (2009: 921)
it is about “…activity carried out without conscious knowledge…”.
The problem is that not having knowledge of one's behaviour does not
mean the behaviour was done during mental obfuscation, because the
behaviour could also have been done with a clear sensorium during a
dissociative state. Not having conscious knowledge of one's behaviour,
moreover, does notmean it was involuntary. For example, when the be-
haviour is forgotten for some reason, then that does not say anything
about whether the behaviour was involuntary. The Sadock deﬁnition
of automatism thus seems over-inclusive.
Yeo alsomade a call to disregard consciousness altogether in consid-
erations of automatism (Yeo, 2001, 2002), since the automatisms of dis-
sociative states, which are sometimes characterised by altered states of
consciousness (like somemeditative and hypnosis states) (Van der Hart
& Dorahy, 2009), are not characterised by impaired consciousness.
Moreover, neurological automatisms may occur while consciousness
and memory are intact. A good example is simple partial seizures, per-
haps especially the sometimes bizarre frontal lobe seizures (Moore &
Puri, 2012: 287–289). Another good example is the alien hand (also
called the anarchic hand), even if less relevant in a forensic context. In
the alien hand an upper limb performs complex and seemingly pur-
poseful movements that, to the distress of a patient, are automatic—that
is, it behaves in the absence of a person's volition to do so (Moore & Puri,
2012: 177–179).
Further to the issue of (un)consciousness, descriptions of automa-
tism given by Simon and Briscoe et al. as well as by Kaliski contain ref-
erence to another potentially confusing issue in that they require the
behaviour of automatism not to be goal directed (Briscoe et al., 1993:
56–59; Kaliski, 2006: 93–112; Simon, 2005: 3969–3987). The problem
is that there are automatisms with behaviour that may be, or may at
least seem to be goal directed. Examples are seen in complex partial sei-
zures (Moore & Puri, 2012: 177–179, 287–289) and dissociative behav-
iour (presuming it would constitute an automatism) in dissociative
identity disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: 291–294).
Simon (2005: 3969–3987), furthermore, explicitly brings the issue of
will into his description of automatism by writing that an automatism
is done without will. By an absence of will, it is meant that behaviour
happens that the person does not will into its happening. The issue of
will is not explicitly raised by Briscoe et al. (1993: 56–59); Sadock
(2009 p. 921) or Kaliski.20
Instead, Briscoe et al. (1993: 56–59) require an absence of planning,
while Kaliski21 requires an absence of cognitive functions. An absence of
planning and cognitive functions may imply an absence of will, but that
may not necessarily be the case. For example, someone with severe de-
gree of dementia may in absence of relevant cognitive functions switch19 See footnote 11 above.
20 See footnote 11 above.
21 See footnote 11 above.on a light rather automatically without planning, driven by the still
present will to see better. One can add further clinical examples that
challenge these descriptions of automatism. Consider tics, chorea, and
hemiballism for example—all of them occur with consciousness being
intact. Some of the deﬁnitions above would include these as automa-
tisms, yet whether these would constitute automatisms is arguable.3.1. Jurisprudential concernwith accountability permeates legal judgement
on automatisms
The interests of good jurisprudence to determine whether the ac-
cused is responsible, case speciﬁc difﬁculties, and legal procedures
have affected, if not blurred, the notion of automatism and related
concepts.22 Nonetheless, South African courts of law accept the notion
that one can, even if rarely, be so overwhelmed by emotions that were
triggered by a severely upsetting event or events, for this to count as a
complete defence in cases of violent crimes like murder, as expressed
in “…Courts should bear in mind that the phenomenon of sane people
temporarily losing cognitive control, due to a combination of emotional
stress and provocation, resulting in automatic behaviour, is rare.”23
The fact that automatism is a complete excuse,24 makes the defence
controversial and viewed with scepticism by courts. Hence the
judgement: “Thus, as remarked earlier, defences such as automatism
and amnesia require to be carefully scrutinised. That they are supported
by medical evidence, although of great assistance to the Court, will not
necessarily relieve the Court from its duty of careful scrutiny for, in
the nature of things, such medical evidence must often be based upon
the hypothesis that the accused is giving a truthful account of the events
in question.”25
A reason the topic is so controversial seems to stem from the
vexing jurisprudential issue of accountability, and perhaps even retribu-
tion. Automatism may be a complete defence in South African law
(Snyman, 2008: 56–57 see also S v Eadie and S v Henry at footnote 24
above) and elsewhere (Arboleda-Flórez, 2002). This is so because, “It
is trite law that a cognitive or voluntary act is an essential element of
criminal responsibility.”26 For being such, automatism is regarded
with scepticism by South African courts (Snyman, 2008: 56–57) and
as suggested in the verdict by Navsa JA that this behaviour would be
rare. His call for judgement in terms of an automatism, does not address
the lack of general agreement about what that would mean. In the legal
profession, themes are similar to thosewe havementioned in the previ-
ous section. In themuch quoted R v Charlson, Judge Barry said, “If he did
not know what he was doing [cf. and absence of knowledge], if his ac-
tions were purely automatic and his mind had no control over the
movement of his limbs [cf. no control], if he was in the same position
as a person in an epileptic ﬁt [which may include all the mentioned
themes] and no responsibility rests on him at all, then the proper verdict
is “not guilty” of all the three charges.”27 The same themes present also
in another much quoted case, R v Kwhere, “Automatism is a term used
to describe unconscious, involuntary behaviour, the state of a person
who, though capable of action is not conscious of what he is doing. It
means an unconscious involuntary act where the mind does not go
with what is being done.”28
Unconscious, as used in R v K means mental obfuscation. However,
according to Yeo (2001, 2002) the issue in automatism is not whetherR v Charlson, 1 All E.R. 864 (1955) quoted in the South African case, S v Mahlinza 1967
(1) SA408 (A).Mahlinzawas chargedwithmurder and attemptedmurder of her children.
She was found not guilty by reason of insanity in what is today the Supreme Court of
Appeal.
28 R v K supra.
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behaviour. Similarly in a recent landmark Canadian case, R v Stone,
where unconsciousness has also not been considered to be a key re-
quirement for automatism. Judge Bastarache, speaking for the majority
of the panel of judges said, “Furthermore, lack of voluntariness, rather
than consciousness, is the key legal element of automatism”.29 This
judgement captures a property—involuntariness—common to the be-
haviour that underpins all the conceptualisations of automatisms
above, unlike the other contested properties attributed to automatisms.
If correct, involuntariness is a key speciﬁcation of the behaviour that
underpins NPCI. We will consider this further below in relation to
behavioural theory.3.2. Non-attribution to mental disorder invokes challenges to psychiatric
testimony
In a defence of NPCI, psychiatrists in South Africa are called upon to
give testimony about the absence of a mental illness or mental defect.
The challenge in excluding a mental disorder is that the very item to
be excluded has been elusive to a clear deﬁnition owing to the complex-
ity of the concept (Fulford &Van Staden, 2013). Mental illness is accord-
ingly not deﬁned in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 and South African
courts have been steering away from giving a deﬁnition of mental ill-
ness. This is for example reﬂected in a statement by the Commission
of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and
Related Matters, who stated, “…it is unnecessary, and undesirable to
attempt a deﬁnition of the concept, insanity,” (Rumpff, Van Wyk,
Gericke, Van Der Merwe and Allen, 1967: 50).
When SouthAfricanpsychiatrists usuallymake a diagnosis ofmental
disorder, they do so according to the criteria of the American Psychiatric
Association (2013), for example the DSM 5, or the ICD-10 criteria of
World Health Organisation (1992). A mental disorder diagnosed by
such criteria, however, may not necessarily be regarded as a mental
disorder or mental defect by courts, and may not even be grounds for
mitigating circumstances. This is the case for example for the diagnosis
of paedophilia.30 On the other hand, there are many examples of invol-
untary behaviour that is not considered as a mental disorder or mental
defect in South African criminal law, including for example epilepsy and
post-ictal confusion,31 and the cognitive deﬁciencies caused by head
injury.32
The cause for an automatism may be thought of as decisive. There
are many causes of automatism. Mental disorder, epilepsy (Moore &
Puri, 2012), head injury (Ahmed, Bierley, Sheikh, & Date, 2000), dissoci-
ation (Fenwick, 1990) and sleepwalking (Snyman, 2008: 55–56) are
well-known causes. Based on the causal attribution, automatisms that
are not attributed to amental illness or defect have been variously called
sane automatisms (see for example S v Eadie33), non-insane automa-
tisms (Briscoe et al., 1993: 56–59), and automatisms “attributable to a
cause other than mental pathology”.34 The distinction between sane
and insane automatism is far from clear cut, however. Epilepsy, dissoci-
ation, head injury, and sleepwalking are often, but not necessarily, intri-
cately associated with a mental disorder, depending on what one's
deﬁnition of mental disorder is. For example, the diagnostic classiﬁca-
tions make provisions for mental disorders caused by epilepsy and
head injury. Onemay also argue that an automatism caused by epilepsy
or brain injury is by its nature necessarily “mental” and “disordered”
when it involves a behavioural disturbance, for such is the logical neces-
sity embedded in the concept of a behaviour disturbance. This view29 R v Stone supra at paragraph 224.
30 S v Madiakotla (440/87) [1988] ZASCA 49 (17 May 1988). Retrieved 2015, 03 June,
from http://www.saﬂii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1988/49.html.
31 R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N).
32 S v Wiid supra.
33 S v Eadie supra at paragraph 14.
34 S v Henry above at paragraph 19.adopts (contentiously) a notion of a mental disorder that is broader
than that captured by the diagnostic classiﬁcation systems.
That the behaviour should not be attributed to a mental disorder,
poses a further conceptual and clinical judgement problem for the psy-
chiatrist. When violent behaviour is attributed to a mental disorder as
ordinarily conceptualised in the diagnostic classiﬁcation systems, it
poses apparently less conceptual difﬁculty, for then the behaviour
may be explained in terms of the symptomatology of a mental illness,
and as amanifestation of such an illness. The critical question, formulat-
ed in the Criminal Procedure Act is whether there is a causal connection
between the alleged offence (i.e., behaviour) and a mental disorder, but
without requiring much clarity about speciﬁcally the behaviour other
than it being a manifestation of a mental illness. In other words, the
property of the behaviour that is crucial in the psychiatrist's assessment
is whether that behaviour is causally connected to a mental disorder.
The other properties of the behaviour, for example whether involun-
tary, are of implicit importance and/or presumedby virtue of themental
disorder.
However, when the offending behaviour (or the alleged offence) is
not attributed to a mental disorder, the deﬁning characteristics of the
behaviour change—the crucial question changes. The properties of the
behaviour, other than the property of being a manifestation of a mental
illness, become crucial in the identiﬁcation of the behaviour. One may
even say the behaviour then comes from another domain altogether.
Small wonder that some psychiatrists in South Africa respond by refus-
ing to give expert testimony on the behaviour, because, so they argue, if
the behaviour is not attributed to mental disorder, then testifying on
such behaviour would fall outside the scope of their psychiatric exper-
tise. The courts, nonetheless, often expect psychiatrists to give testimo-
ny, no less to rule out behaviour being caused bymental disorder. Going
further than that by giving psychiatric testimony also on the behaviour
(when not attributed to mental disorder), requires conceptual clarity
about which behaviour underpins NPCI.
4. Toward clarity on the behaviour in giving psychiatric testimony
As we have considered above, jurisprudential concerns as point of
departure would principally pursue the interests of establishing
accountability. Psychiatrically, as we considered it above, one may
expect that the point of departure and interest would be about the caus-
al attributions and (the lack of) a mental disorder. Notwithstanding the
merits for these interests, we propose that distinct to these interests the
underpinning behaviour is ﬁrst brought into focus and clariﬁed both
theoretically and in the psychiatric assessment and testimony—that is,
prior to and distinct from the jurisprudential concern with accountabil-
ity and the psychiatric concern with (non-) attribution to mental
disorder.
A reason for focusing on behaviour ﬁrst, we contend, is that psychi-
atric testimony is aptly within professional scope more so when in
terms of behaviour than in terms of an automatism as deﬁned by courts
for purposes of judgement on accountability, even more so considering
the inconclusive state of affairs on what constitute an automatism (as
described above). Furthermore, psychiatric assessment and testimony
about the behaviour distinct from a clinical judgement on whether
that behaviour is causally attributed to a mental disorder (or not),
helps to avert a conﬂation (and potential confusion) between the be-
haviour under assessment and the challenges in making a judgement
that the behaviour is not attributed to a mental disorder.
4.1. Testimony informed by behavioural analysis
In addressing the question on which behaviour underpins NPCI, we
thus set aside at ﬁrst the requirement that the behaviour should not
be attributed to a mental disorder. Once the behaviour is clariﬁed
through a process of progressive speciﬁcation of the behaviour, the
speciﬁcation of being non-pathological may be added but should be
35 S v Smith (1) SACR (A) 130 (1990).
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itself.
So qualiﬁed, the question on which behaviour underpins NPCI is
guided here by a functional analysis as is well-established in behaviour
therapy. The clinical assessment of candidate behaviour in a particular
court case may follow suit by which psychiatric testimony would be
based on embedded expertise in behavioural theory.
Behavioural theory (Martin & Pear, 2015), which is well-established
in psychiatric theory and practise, may contribute to attain clarity con-
ceptually and clinically. Behavioural theory situates behaviour in a
chain of chronological events whereby the behaviour is distinguished
from antecedents and consequences. The antecedents to behaviour in-
clude the ﬁnal stimulus or trigger for the behaviour. The consequences
of the behaviour may in turn also be stimuli to further behaviours, and
they may impact on the behaviour through a feedback loop in the
chain of events.
Regarding the behaviour itself, behavioural theory provides for the
assessment of a speciﬁc behaviour in terms of its topography, intensity,
latency, duration, frequency, and sometimes quality (Martin & Pear,
2015: 201–213). The topography of behaviour refers to the form of
movement. Say a trained boxer accurately, and with great force, notices
an opening in his opponent's defence (i.e., the antecedent event or trig-
ger) and he then punches his opponent on the jawwith the effect of his
opponent staggering backwards (i.e., the consequence). The form of his
armmovementmay for example be in a straight line or an arc (Martin &
Pear, 2015: 201). When repetitive, behaviour has a frequency. In the
case of the boxer, frequency refers to how often he punches his oppo-
nent in given time period (Martin & Pear, 2015: 201). Duration refers
to the time it takes from the inception of the (arm) movement until it
ends (Martin & Pear, 2015: 206). Latency refers to the time between
the occurrence of a stimulus and the onset of behaviour (Martin &
Pear, 2015: 208). In the boxer's case it may be the time it takes between
the start of noticing an opening (the stimulus) andmoving his arm. The
intensity of behaviour is the force or magnitude with which a speciﬁc
behaviour is performed (Martin & Pear, 2015: 207). In the case of the
boxer the punch is of enough force for his opponent to stagger back-
wards. The quality of behaviour refers to an evaluation of the behaviour
by an observer who gives his or her impression of how well the move-
ment has been performed (Martin & Pear, 2015: 208). In the boxer's
case, the skilfulness of the punch as judged by boxing judges and
whether this particular kind of punch is permissible during a boxing
match refers to the qualitative aspect.
Behaviour theory's articulation in terms of antecedents and conse-
quences of behaviour is useful to specify the behaviour that underpins
NPCI. From the preceding sections, we take it that the antecedent that
speciﬁes and triggers the behaviour underpinning NPCI is a set of nega-
tive and overwhelming emotions. The consequence that speciﬁes the
behaviour underpinning NPCI, is actual or potential physical damage
or physical injury by virtue of which we speak of violent behaviour.
That consequence in violent behaviour is not necessarily actual physical
damage or injury, but potentially such as is illustrated in the following:
Say X takes a knife and stabs at Y, the behaviour of X is still violent even
if he misses Y. Whether the behaviour is speciﬁed as violent, further-
more, neither depends on whether the damage or injury was intended.
If, X is delirious and in a confused manner randomly stabs about with a
knife but Y is not injured because Y has side-stepped,wemay also speak
of violent behaviour even though there is no intention to stab Y.
Whether violent behaviour is intended or unintended, behaviour
theory has it that the consequences may have effects on further behav-
iour. Two consequences are of particular relevance here: The ﬁrst is that
the violent behaviourmay be reinforcedwith the effect that it continues
(Martin & Pear, 2015: 32–39, 121–125, 140–149). An example is where
violent behaviour continues because it is experienced as gratifying (e.g.
in sadism or revenge). This means each consecutive observation of a
victim's pain or fear response or even the effect of the body being in-
jured is a stimulus (or antecedent) for repeating a violent act. Thesecond consequence may be that the violent behaviour is inhibited (or
“punished” as used in behaviour theory) with the effect that it
discontinues (Martin & Pear, 2015: 22–29; 121–125, 140–149). An ex-
ample is when emotional distress in the perpetrator (for example: hor-
ror, disgust, fear) is invoked by observing a victim's pain or fear, or the
effect of bodily injury to the effect that the behaviour discontinues.
Through behaviour theory, the behaviour that underpins NPCI has
been qualiﬁed as emotionally triggered violent behaviour. If Judge
Bastarache's panel is correct (see above),28 the behaviour underpinning
NPCI can be speciﬁed further as involuntary. Involuntariness may be
difﬁcult to assess practically, but such purpose may also be informed
by behavioural theory. The illuminating questions are which topogra-
phy, intensity, latency, duration, frequency, and quality of behaviour
correspond with involuntariness.4.2. Illustrating behavioural analysis by using a case
To illustrate howa behaviour analysis as set out abovemay be useful,
we use the case of S v Smith, in which the defence argued for NPCI.35.
Ms. Smith fell in love with Mr. Theron, a married man 19 years older
than she. Mr. Theron repeatedly (but in retrospect with duplicity) pro-
fessed his love for her and said that he would leave his wife to marry
her. While nothing came from Theron's promises, Ms. Smith found
herself so attracted to Mr. Theron that she simply could not cease
their relationship. As their relationship continued, Ms. Smith in fact
gave up much of what was important to her for him, including her
studies.
One day Ms. Smith and Mr. Theron visited a mutual friend at the
friend's house. They went together in Mr. Theron's motor vehicle. A
while after they had arrived,Mrs. Theron appeared,much toMs. Smith's
surprise. The purpose of Mrs. Theron's presence, presumably with the
foreknowledge of Mr. Theron, was to attempt to get Ms. Smith to dis-
continue her relationship with Mr. Theron. Using abusive language,
Mrs. Theron told Ms. Smith that she and her husband had reconciled
and that Ms. Smith should stay out of their lives. Then Mr. and Mrs.
Theron made a point of embracing and kissing each other in Smith's
presence, presumable to show Ms. Smith how committed they were
to each other. After this display, Ms. Smith asked Mr. Theron to take
her (Ms. Smith) back to her home, presumable with both herself and
Mr. Theron driving away together in Mr. Theron's vehicle. However,
Mr. and Mrs. Theron left the house and went to Mr. Theron's motor ve-
hicle. Ms. Smith at ﬁrst had stayed behind, because she had wanted to
talk things over with Mr. Theron. However, Mr. Theron told the friend
to inform Ms. Smith that he was not going to do so. Furthermore, he
had Ms. Smith informed that she should come and get into his motor
vehicle or else walk home. Ms. Smith then also went outside to
Mr. Theron's vehicle.
Once outside, Ms. Smith found Mr. Theron again embracing and
kissing his wife. At that time Smith unzipped her handbag, removed a
handgun and shouted, “I will kill him and go to jail for him.” Then she
ﬁred 3 shots in rapid succession at Mr. Theron, who by that time had
turned and attempted to ﬂee. One of the shots eventually caused his
death. After having ﬁred the shots, Ms. Smith drove off in Mr. Theron's
vehicle. At that time Ms. Smith did not realise that she had fatally
wounded Mr. Theron. She only later discovered that Mr. Theron had
been killed and then she reported at a police station.
Ms. Smith later claimed that she had no recollection of what had
happened, except for having heard two bangs. The defence claimed
criminal incapacity due to “extreme emotional distress”. However, Ms.
Smith was convicted of murder in the High Court. The conviction was
upheld by the SCA, but her sentence was reduced from 6 to 3 year
imprisonment, because the SCA considered the case as having “special
circumstances”, making 6 years imprisonment “unduly harsh”.
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follows: The ﬁnal straw, or triggering event (which some may call the
emotional blow), in a series of emotional upsets and humiliations was
when her lover embraced and kissed his wife (again) at his vehicle.
Smith was very upset at the time. The antecedent (stimulus or trigger)
was a humiliating event (at least in local culture). The latency between
the triggering event and the ﬁring of the shots was not stated, but it is
reasonable to infer that it was no longer than a few seconds, allowing
her to unzip the handbag, ﬁnd and remove the gun, arm it, point it
and squeeze the trigger. Similarly, the duration may be inferred as last-
ing no longer than about 3 seconds to ﬁre 3 shots in rapid succession.
The topography of the behaviour involves pointing a gun at aﬂeeing vic-
tim. The force of the behaviourwas that of squeezing a trigger. The qual-
ity of the behaviour can be described as accurate enough to hit a ﬂeeing
victim. In this case the consequences of the behaviour were hitting the
victim, but it is unclear from the casewhether the perpetrator noticed it.
The behavioural analysis also points to potentially illuminating
questions, even if all answers may not be so clear in this case: The trig-
gering event was humiliation, but was it sufﬁcient to potentially trigger
such intensely negative emotions to overwhelm and incapacitate the
ability to behave voluntarily? If so, is the behaviour itself consistently in-
voluntary? The latency may be a helpful property to consider, referring
to the period from the “ﬁnal straw” until Smith squeezed the trigger for
the ﬁrst time. Too long a period (for example) may defy a claim that the
behaviour was involuntary. Similarly for the time it took to complete
the violent behaviour (i.e., the duration). Regarding the topography
and the quality of the behaviour, the skill and precision of the behaviour
may be telling about its involuntariness. The intensity of the behaviour
in this case is unlikely to be informative, for it simply entailed lifting
an arm and squeezing a trigger, unless for example, the ﬁrearm is
particularly difﬁcult to arm or had failed to ﬁre at ﬁrst.
The behaviour (whether a physical or a mental act) that was per-
formed in preparation of the violent behaviour should also be consid-
ered as to whether its properties match with involuntariness. In this
case, a question is whether Smith's unzipping of her handbag, ﬁnding
the gun, removing and arming it are all involuntary behaviours. What
does the verbal utterance that she will “kill him and go to jail for him”
tell about the voluntariness of these preparatory behaviours?4.3. (Not) attributing the behaviour to mental disorder
The behaviour that underpins NPCI has been speciﬁed above as
emotionally triggered involuntary violent behaviour. A focus on
the behaviour differentiates the emotionally triggered involuntary
violent behaviour from its potential causal attributions—both con-
ceptually and practically. The behaviour and/or the extreme nega-
tive emotions in emotionally triggered involuntary violent
behaviour may be attributed causally to a mental disorder, but nei-
ther need to be caused so. Theymay be attributed causally to epilep-
sy, or a psychoactive substance or any of the causes of automatisms,
but again neither need to be so caused.
Whether these causal attributions pertain, is a consideration
that is conceptually and clinically distinct from whether candidate
behaviour (in an alleged offence) conforms to emotionally triggered
involuntary violent behaviour. Accordingly, psychiatric assessment
and testimony may be articulated (as far as information and other
contingent constraints may allow) in terms of the violent behaviour
and its properties as informed by behavioural theory; whether the
violent behaviour was involuntary; whether the accused experi-
enced extreme negative emotions; whether the extreme negative
emotions were indeed triggered by an upsetting event; whether
the upsetting event, the extreme negative emotions, and the invol-
untary behaviour are causally connected; and whether that behav-
iour is attributed (or not) to a mental disorder, a psychoactive
substance, epilepsy or any other cause.5. Conclusions
In the interest of sound psychiatric testimony and consequently
good jurisprudence, some steps toward clarity have been suggested to
address the confusing issues in non-pathological criminal incapacity
and automatism. Clarity has been gained by recognising the confusing
and even conﬂicting issues, and we have suggested that behaviour
and its qualities should be brought into focus distinct from whether it
is (not) causally attributed to amental disorder; and considered distinct
from jurisprudential considerations of accountability. Clarity on the
behaviour can then be gained by specifying it in terms of its crucial
features as informed by behavioural theory. We have identiﬁed two
common features for this speciﬁcation from descriptions of automa-
tisms relevant in NPCI: involuntariness and triggering extreme negative
emotions. Accordingly, “emotionally triggered involuntary violent
behaviour” is a construct posed for unpacking in further conceptual
work, and investigation of its practical and reliable application. The con-
struct denotes a particular kind of behaviour thatmaybe conceptualised
and assessed distinctly fromwhether it is causally attributed to amental
disorder (or not); as well as frommeeting criteria for an automatism as
deﬁned by courts for purposes of judgement on accountability.Acknowledgment of funding
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